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IN THI' SUPREME C'OPPT OF THE STATE r1F UTAH
DIXIE STATE BANK,
Plaintiff end
Appellant,
Case l'io. 19375

VS.

KIRK BRACKEN and LINFORD
BRACKEN,
Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS'

BRIEF

NATURE OF TBE CASE
Plaintilf sued for a deficiency judament after
repossession and sale of a 1979 Ford Pickup.
counterclaim alleginq wrongful repossession based on the
Plaintiff's failure to act in good faith.

On the day of trv

stipulation WilS reached in which Plaintiff would obtain judar··
for the amount of its complaint, plus accrued interest an,1 '"·
Defendants would agree to a dismissal of their counterclaim,
the issue of attorney's fees claimed by Plaintiff wouln be
submitted to the triill

~udge

for determination.

presented on the issue of reasonable attorney's fee;. c,rn;

tr<>

trial court awarded Plaintiff $1,500.
Plaintiff has appealed this award, cliliming tli;,c
is clearly an abuse of discrPt ion in liqht of some conciliat··'

nts m<i<!e by the trial judge ard

1 ,,1

,iJ

Uco issue

c.tt'11nir«ction cind

:ward•d,

,,1nr1.

Gf

maintain that an agreement was reached to
attorney's fees to the trial judge for

to accept without appeal whatever fees were

that this aqreement to accept the trial court's

~nd

•ion was

~r

finding that the higher

by Plainti ft were reasonable.

:h,t

lv~cndants
Jlr1'

i:l

the only consideration Defendants' received in

tor the dismissal with prejudice of their counterclaim.
Further, Defendants believe the decision of the trial

er the issue of attorney's fees is correct, being based on

·~·r
1

1 i,1·

1 i , .• i nq cvj nence and ori equitable considerations that caused
'•11•rt

b0low to award less than the amount Plaintiff sought.

<r•

r)Ample,

lh,.·.

Pl

thP trial judge made a specific finding of fact that

intiff made the initial mistake when it set up the loan on

•PGi-~rnual
~1·fendcnts'

basis,

rather than a monthly basis, which caused

arcount to show that their payments were current or

ra1J i11 <idvancP on the loan until the bank discovered its error.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT

The trial

judge accepted the stipulation of the

•"'''"s, .1nd granted judgment of $4,748.39, being $3,858.84
rr·,•

•pal deficiency and $889.55 accrued interest to date of
The trial judge then heard the testimony of the

'1 ( lT

"'

"rr '"'"

~or

both parties on the issue of a reasonable

f"'' in this case,

listened to the arguments of counsel

2

for both parties,

OTJ(l ruled thrit

thE_

fnr its cittcJrney's

sum of $1,SOO

flefr>nc'.dnl~

f

.c·t1(•1J 1 (j

J ',

cl'-

tr·<::

Plaintiff :;eeks to helve thl.' Supn·nie C0urt

tr 1 ~

""'r1

trial judqe abus£>c' his discretion in awcirrlinq att0rr1r>y', fc+·
$1,500 or that havino one<> stated th,1t Mr.

lluohes di•1

his time and that

for the ti"''

lti s

effort he expended,
the

fees 1-.·c·n., rPasunable

that

r1(\

.,.,, ••

the court below was cornrnitt1·d le

fees requested.
Defenclc.nts bPl ir\'P th•' ayr<ecmc·nt to i1Ccc•F\

judge's decision as
Defew'.~'

t I"'

tr;·

final rrevents this appeal.

•.s mc.intain that the f0cs awardecl WC' re within

t 1,~

n:::iraf!le...._,,..,_J: s of the evidence presPnled n.r.d Y..'(_•11 withir1 th•

cliscrC'tion conferred

the lowC'r court,

l'l'

which dicur:tic·.r. ·'·

not be disturb0d 0n this .ippeal because of the c·•e11itahlt ',
involved in this case.

STATFMFNT OF FACTS

Dixir· Ste tr:::. P.Clck
mistukc r,..,1hen

it

as co-obligors,

S<'t

ur

a

locin

on ,July 19,

$7, 695 nnd rci] )ced

( "bank'

1

yivcn

19~9.

the appeJ lc1nt, rraf:r

),

tr;

The

for intcrPst at the

rcspnndl'rit

loan wc1s
[dte

required 48 monthly ri0yrnents of $210.JO.

Of

J4i

(F f'-l,

("Lr

'.-J

'1,

1J,r

r"

1

';'I

1
I' lL "' ·

of setting lhis loan up as a mcnthly payment,

tea~

h1v0,
1

,

1 l <·'l n

the hank set the loan up on its computers as a

( r, P- 7) .

, ·:0ry eix months,
ct

as long as Brackens made one

tho bank's records would reflect a

on this 100n.

,Jh1'.·

Tl''

Thus,

was clearly responsible for this error.

~-,-,nk

·n ctiltC·r'Cnt to the COUrt,

't'

Jn

the banf:'s attorney stated:

"Hy

rr·son of Dixie State Bank making an internal
error, thr'v failed to discover the delinquency
"f th" BrockPns until January uf 1981
" (T 4, L
,.,·mpll+<-r
l(J-L').

'':

is shr•wn on the face of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.
f',r1ckr>n

ci

rs

wo· told that the loan was current and even paid in

;n~

If

inquired ilbout the status of the loan on several

:· 7

'j'.

r, ;

- c 1- cou 1<1 r<";tll t

t 1i

1

!

2r

·r 1

r:.ul

in

t·

wu~

r1drriitted by Murray Gubler,

hi:' deposition on page 18,

trial

"'h

That such an error on the bank's

L l - 18 ) .

in Brackens being told they were current or

L'ir:"n~1ce

r·: ,., r•1ent,

' 'r

T 8,

the bank's

lines 7-20.

(R

iudoe sptc·cifically founc1 that the original

should be placed on the bank, and this undoubtedly

si(Jr>i t ic-a11t in his ruling regarding attorney's fees,

as

foJJr·vino rolloguy between the trial judge and

tr:•

t, r
"~;, .

c,.,.c.

the rulino of $1,500 attorney's fees had been made:
Buy hes:
Let me 8ay, for the record, I think the
ar~ extremely low for what has happened in this

All right.
As a matter of fact, I want in
11nc1inos the fact that the initial mistake was made
And Lhat's uncontroverted, isn't that
the Lank.
1'r 1 rrr·ct?"
(T ]8, L 15-21).

Thr'

1h

r·ciurt:

1 _·

4

~I

judge for his signilturc'

IR 111-1 lC).

was made by respondents'

attorney fur thc· f<1il11ro

not made by the lower court
reading the

IP 8/-101)

anrl

('rinnr,t

cf the Court rroceedinas nf

tr~nscript

tr

;, ,

1- ('

+=-r

H,'1

1

~~)

A comparison o[ the Transcript,

paaes 34-40, with the "F'rc

Of Fact And Cnnclusiol's Uf Law"

(R 11 l -l l

liter0r; 1 license ernr-·loyed bv Mr.

Hughrs

"findings" to support his appeal.
cross-appeal

,

(Scc12 responder: ts'

~),

i J J ustrcilt·> th

in d1ilft1nCJ tr•P

R<ospondents h<1ve file•:

points nn

the Supreme Court on or about Auaust 26,

cross-appe~l

1983.)

filcc

1·

contenri:•c ''.-·

the trial c·ourt committed re\'0rsible error by surnr1ziri l'/ c:ccr·
(S cl9), v.1:1wut allowing cirgurr.r'nt,
Tb is Of'\i tted,

these pror::c"r oh1rct' ''-

but crucial,

finding

tL<·t the ilf-P'''

rn3de the initial error was ev<"ntually correch•d by
w·hen he prepared,

and the trial court

cignen,

ill'

"Finc1ing Of Fact" 1-:hich was fi lee] in the> Supr0rne
6.

198].

That

~'.r.

J11,·l···

nclc11ticno 1
Cnu~+

er

t1nclinn states:

"1.
That the initi.::1] error wor:: rnu~e by tht-' pj· irt
Pank when ;~t set up the loiln on c1 sEerni-;innu.:d Lac
instead of a mnr.thly basic:, and lhat th0 P,cink':
consequentl~
showed thilt Defendants were currc:
in fact paid in aclvanc< 0r- this Jo,1n) ur-l1 l tt• '
ci scovcred 1 to· <'rror.
1

1

After the bank discovered it,: c1·ror, Mur,~.i', cd
wrote to Kirk Pracken

([10fendant' s Ezhibi t

24 l a skin'] h .,,.

1

$787.04 immediately ann to sign, and have Linford Prackcr
new note ar:n security .:i<ir<:>Prnent

for th" sarnl'

01

igincil

,w•ri.i·'

"" ,,r:.

l 1 nwcv0r,

I] cl')

1,:

the new notEC was at the interest rate of

percent instead of the fourteen

lnt''I in th<· oriainal

t

Ii•

1

percent

(Plaintiff's Exhibit l; R 112,

Frc>ckPns objected to the increase of four

',I,,

"1 '1

note

(14%)

(4%)

percent

ntcrco:+- rc1te, and Murra'/ Gubler admitterl in his
that the Br2ckens were never offered the chance to

,;µoc1t1r,;·

r"'·' .te

ttw

,.,1blP1,

paae 21;

at the lower 14% rate

10211

(Deposition of Murray

R 141).

Aaain, on June 29, 1981 Murray Gubler wrote to Kirk
··ta<

k('n ,1skina him to pa'/ accrued interest of $946.12 and to sign

•he nrw nnte

security agreement enclosed, or to refinance the

a~d

"t

r'J• \· somewhere: else."

f,

'nr",

1•,1

c,,,

.le

1

«I!;

felt

l 981.

l'pon receiving these last documents,

they had until August 5, 1981 to refinance, if they

nr to cic:;n the papers 2nd make their first payment, but
they

ir

The enclosed note called for the first payment to be

/\unust 5,

"rac'L0n~

1c1,

V.'c t<'

j

n the procc:ss of seeking refinancing, the truck

·,.,,, F'J"''·ses:·etl nn July 25,
'•

1

1,

• 0 •1ll

••:t'•."

(Defendants' Exhibits 28, 29,

1981

ratP,

1·rcj'H' ·tecl.

Th~

:.;',,Gtl0.00.

Except for the increase in the

the Brackens agreed to everything else the bank
(P 24, 'l\7-9).

repossessed truck was sold at public sale on

i''r:mbcr JO, 1981

1

&

ten dci.ys prior to the due date of the first payment

i r e·i bv the bunk's documents.

,i1t. rr'st

','J"

As

the rcite of interest had been increased from the original

to 18%.

·4~

See Defendant's Exhibit No. 27.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12) to the Brackens

(T 5, L 4-13).

Just minutes prior to this public

J,,~ Rrnckens riet with Murray Gubler and agreed to all of the

6

hGnk's

incluc:inc;

dPmand~,

agreen to appl 'i the ent

l

ir.rrt'Z-1~;1·

in tht:-_'

in~r·r·( c-;t

rr' S'i, 000. 00 nrackens hiid , r

tociether t0w;irc1 the loan.
let t

th(~

(R 24,

~10-11;

T 10-11).

1 , 1 p,,n

Mr.

i

th•' room to qet_ the figur<es to conclude the aqreur"nt

while he w;is out he spoke tc the bctnk presiderct, Mr. Hir'kr•'iln,
testified to that conversation as follows:
"Q.
What was Silid by you and what was said f) htrn
Gubler cluring that conversatinn?
A.
Well, I was intPrested in finding out whcJt w;is
going on, because I w0s not that closely invnlqr' '"the siturition.
When I saw the Brackens in there,~·
indicated that they -- that was the day for th" s;,1.
the truck and that the Brackens were interested i"
trying to neqoti0te a new arrangement with the bar,}:_
told Mr. Gubler that I was not interested i11
rene9ntiatin0 the situation ;iqain; thilt I wantec U.t
sale to go through.
('.
lJid Mr. Gubler convpy to you the terr% 0f the,
you word it, renegotiations that w0rP beinq c'li,cuscr.
;1.
Ne, he did not." (R 140, Deposition ()f ,f0hr, l'.'1:
Hickm211, page 9, lines 6-18).

Thereafter,

the bank brought suit for

the 2mount of $3,858.84
alleging a wrongful

(P 2,

5;13)

;:i

dc,firiPnc:·

and Brackens counterclairrc·

reposs0ssion because the repossessiCJn tr:

rlare some 10 days prior to the due date of the first
rrquired by thc- ra;ik's offe1· of June 2g,
rxhibit No.
acted in

at trial"

11

(Defendant's

The counterclaim also alleged the hank he"

27)

gor,0

1981

Pi1'''1'CC'

faith",

(R 4~,

'11/)

and sought relief for "tbe arr ount p1'"'·1

for damagf'S tc Rracker,s credit rcput ,er·

and for cxempl tlr\- d<:Jmagcs of "$200, 000. 00 or such
will serve thee purposre of punitive damagPs."
On Vav 11, 1983 the trial b0gan.
presentc.d their op0ninq ara11!T'0nts.

oUlf'T

(F 45, 'l13).
Both at t<irney::,

11c0 th::t

recPSS aP aqreement was rri\ched thut

(l)

appellar.t

1idqment aqainst rrspondents on its complaint for the entire
i1·PC'.' ,,f $3,858.84 plus accrued interest of $889.55,
1 of ~·l, 748. 39,
1 1·,,ct

s";

(2)

.,tt

plus costs to be submitted by a "Memorandum

thLlt respondents'

1··1·,,idice; i1lld

(3)

for a

counterclaim be dismissed with

that the only remaining issue of a reasonable

·n·<'y's fee be submitted on testimony to the trial court for

1

··11

J.1t 1 1ni1Uon

1' ui

1

t a

and that the parties accept whatever the trial

,1w<1rdc:ed.

Appellants now claim that this last condition was

of the agreement.

p~rt

Mr.

Hughes presented thee

•iruli1tinn tn the Court, and it is concededly not clear what was
··",mt J-,,/ his statc>ment that:

"That the judgment is not to be executed on for 90
di1ys; and thi1t J will submit this morning testimony
reqarding attorney's fees, and that the Court will rule
on that matter." (T 15-16).
·,1i, C«Jlt

th< n heard the testimony of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Miles

:1·1circli1•<.1 zittorney's

fees,

and ruled that Brackens should pay the

S1,'·,oo attorney's fees in addition to the amount of the

d

In ruling,
ir

the Court added

st,-1t-r·ment:

"One final cuveat.
I believe I put it in the area
where both of you probably will consider appealing it.
May J encourage you to do so?" (T 36, L 11-14).
As snon as the Court made this statement, respondents'
rn''" 0<1v1sed the trial court that the parties had agreed to
·1«·, 11.it!."ut appe'11, his decision on the amount of attorney's
I':

·,;,

L 6-10), and this fact is supported by Linford

h·stin,or:y (P 95, ~6-9).
, it !1":

However,

r•'rty could uf-'peal his ruling
8

the trial court felt

(T 38, L 11-14).

Although thP record does not
Court ruled that
Hickman,

reflc·ct

it, ar· ,.,,, 1

the fees awardPd Plaintiff were

the bank President,

ilnd Mr.

Huqhes,

~l,'.1.,·1,

l<r

th£> hanf'.'s "''''

immediately demonstrated their displeasurP, whirh prumi
above quoted statement inviting an appenl.

From thi1t 1.·nir'.

as a rending of the transcript clearly shows, Mr.

Huqhe•

expressed his oh4ections to the trial court, which resulted
the trial court making some conciliatory statement·r; that ha·
found their way into the "Findings Of Fact /\.nd Conclusion'
I.aw"

to support i1pp0llant's argument thilt a

requested

cc

findinq t.hcit itr

fees were reasonalile should now preclude the· tri,11

court from awarding less than the full
However,

fees found "reasonaLlc'

the trial court obviously took into

c·c·nsineration equitable issues,

such as the fact that lhe kr!

made tl'e initial mistake that caused the defilult situaticr t•
arise

('!'

Hughes

18, L 18-21), and made that clear when pressed bv '-'·.

(T 39, L 4-5,

14-17).
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S A\'lARD OF $1, 500 ATTORNEY'S FEE W/\S Pf'cl ,;
AND WAS NOT A CLEAP ABUSE OF DISCPETION, BUT W/\S BASED Oh
(1) CONFLICTING EVIDENCE REGARDING A PEASONABLE FH; (c)
AMOrJN'I' INVOLV1':D IN THE CASE; AND ( 3) SEVEPAL EOll ITA!lT.F. FN"T<

(l)
Mr.

Huqhes,

$10,000

THE CONFLICTING EVIDENCE:

2.ppel}an.t's counsel,

(T 13),

stated

and thP po,-;sibility H.i't

In his openirCJ
he wa.8

sc·,ekino

1

rt

responJc·nts m1rjl:t

,'Jssessecl such n high fee in resisting a $3, 858. 84 r·L1in• Ii·
'11),

obviously prod Pel

rPspondent s

14-J(;),

9

into seekinq sEct

i Jpme11t

I"

f

In his actual testimony, however, Mr. Hughes testified
$14r, at the time the repossessed truck was sold

1 •"•if

(T 18,

·,_'I

llis testimony was that his fefes had increased to $2,155

tr1<

v:,,,Jnesday one week befo;e the trial on Wednesday, May 11,

,i

J

(1

1,,,, ;ir

23, I. 10-13).

J r,q

jurv instructions between the Wednesday prior to trial
the week of the trial, working on both Saturday and

~·ndav

ur,;1,·

He testified that he spent 31 hours

l'J' ;:•, L G-12).

l\ppellants sought fees of $2,325

r, ' ' ' limes s7r, ,00 per hour)
'· irig 'jury instructions
":e·

1

for this time, mostly spent on

IT 21, L 9-14).

An additional $300

equ0st.ed for paralegal time to review with Mr. Hughes the
"nstructions and to put the file together

lun

(31

.1cc1 lw .1Jso requested $67.50

for clerk's time

(T 21, L 14-16),
(T 21, L 17-23).

Thro sun• rif $2,155, $2,325, $300 and $67.50 is $4,847.50, which is
tlw 'ce>Ld

tees sought by appellants

(T 23, L 10-19).

'·' llqJ1t c•y ;;ppr'lLints exceeded the $3,858.84

The fees

(F 3, '!Ill principal

,-,,fic1•"1cy suecl upon by almost $1,000.00!
On cross-examination, however, Mr. Hughes acknowledged

r,i·· pr<'pu;:ation went well beyond the pleadings, admitting

tl.11

,,,t

I«· hnd p1epnred to defend against matters not within the

'. l ·", •! in"'

(T 2 4 - 2 5 ) .

Jn fact,

he admitted that he had spent time

r1nn tG defend aoainst estoppel and waiver arguments, which
i1n1c1tive defenses that must be specifically pled
1•,,
•

.1

,c_-1(,

(T 25)

.1:firM.1tive defenses were not pled in the "Answer And

t• rclaiin"

rc11sl'd

of respondents

(F 42-45)

in the counterclaim.

10

No constitutional issues

somewf-.at crnss
educate
~roof

aric'l

criss-crc,:::s rtrr1 per!-2r_

Cou-:--i:: •,.1 ith rE.:spect

th~

is in.

Ernptasis

11

to

I,~~-:=

regardir.s " r<'cisonabl" fee in this case,
thc-t a reasonable fee woulr'l re

r.

a1_l---1:_2~!__:,-.~~~

{T 34,

A~de~.

r

20~

ar.c'

wac

J •

t:·,s te•:.

of tr.E- 'lmn·Jr.t ·ic.;c, 1·:r;e' "'

l:e approximately S900 or a $4, 100 princi[:i'll ;ird ir,tr·bst
Respondents'

30' 18-25).

c•.e

attorney testi :iPc' that t.ic •',·cs •.c

the day of trial a!'1our.t.Pd to a total of $1, 2S l

IT ?P. • , ,_.,.

The trial court found that these fees <:ere not AXcessi

I~

10-15).
The evidence presented to the trial cc•urt
$90G fer,

to a $1281

fee,

to the $4847.50 fee cnuaht

The trial court stated th2t the Jury
were excessive

(T 36,

/1-25;

inescapable that the tri2l

T 37, L 1-5).

~udae

properly weiahed the ror+

determined that a reasonable fee in this case

THE AMOUNT

insl1ur•i~

Tr.e ccnc iusicr

evidence in light of his review nf the file,

( 2)

P;•c~d

INVOLVED

his

"'"s

~rowlP~nc

$1, 500.

II\' 'l'HE CAS2.

ob•;iously felt that 2ppellant' s attorney had grc.,;sly •·''
this case,

i1S

evidenced by the trial court's

analcc~

judge stated:
"Let me sciy this to you:
Yell ran t,1\".e two J1ttl• ..
cars out and wreck them in the micldle of the rou:
ilnd have all the people in hc,re v.·ilnes' i1, tlv'·':
all of thei.r deposi tiuns and prc;>ar0 for tri ' "·

i, "t ructions and
take the time of the Court, and the
lc'V')'f'rs ccin do ull of those things.
And when you get
down tu it, you can try the suit on the same basis and
jJrirciple that would apply in any kind of a case of
simila1 kind.
But keep in mind it was just little toy
·ars out there.
And so I find that in this case that
\lie attorney fee is in relationship to the amount to be
1ssessed against the defendant." (T 37, L 16-25; T 38,

), l).

: ,1ct

'rt'l'

is made clear by reading the finding of the trial

:r'1:r, 1,'hcre

the trial judge added, in his own handwriting, the

'"derlined portion quoted below:

"18.

The Court finds that the amount of attorney's
claimed of $4, 747 .50 (sic), though reasonable in
all regard, constitutes a sum approximating the debt
clue "n the note, absent any assessment for attorney's
tees, and from the testimony and the file the Court
tind~ $1 500.00 is a reasonable fee to be assessed
_u0airost DPfend<rnts." (R 115, <JI 18).
fe("C

,t.c

t

""a 1 cnurt was obviously saying that while the fees claimed

'h,

,·1r,relLrnt were reasonable in the abstract, they must be
factnrs in this specific case such as the amount of

0y

•ernp~1,d

•i,c· der.•t on whcch suit was brought.
"'

0

c1nd with accrued interest, was $4,748.39

-'!,

Th•' tried
,t t<
1

That amount was $3,858.54

rnPy'

(R

(T 16, L 3-6).

was saying it was unreason0ble to incur

,~ourt

fees that exceeded or approximated this debt.

r

•-pnndents will readily acknowledge that as the amount in issue

li~(

1

sc

,, rPa son ah 1 e attorney's fee may equa 1 or even exceed

~,,

"''''1"'

,

Hut

'" c;F-

especially in cases involving less than

lciirnf'c'l,

when the clc,im is approximately $4,000.00, the

tel

t

"

reasonable fee should not approximate the

'.''l'li, Ult dl'l.-t, ,1nd found a reasonable fee would be $1,500 •
11,r,
t!1

ct

r<.' 1 at

ion ship of the fee to the amount recovered was

se~cral

factors mentioned by the Utah Supreme Court

12

in Turtle Management,
(Utah 1982)
fee.

Inc. v.

Haqqjc

Manaaew0nt

as important in deterndning

The Court said, at page 671,

,1

r<'il'."

G4~

P.

rc;ohlP ·,t,.,,

that:

"Severa} factors have bPer: considPrPd }-'\.' v,~r; J\i
in determining the ai:•propriatE· <.iv:,,rc1 of •1th,,,,
fees: the rcl<itionship of thP fpe tn the .. mc•unt
recovered, the novelty a!'C! difficulty c•f +_iv:-J:-c•i•·
involved, the overall result achieved, arnl ti,,
necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate• i
rights in the contract. 58 A.L.R. 3d 23S (19741; ;r
Jur.2d Costs ~78 (1965); 25 c.LT.S. Damaqes (C,Q 1;
The district court appropriately took ir.to ac-ccJnf
factors such as the complexity of the issue" ir"rJl•
and the results achieved in awarding attorney's ff'e:.
Emphasis Added.

In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tacoma,
P.2d 226,

199 \·:c1sh. 7!,

123 ALR 399 the court helcl that an ilttornc·\" • tee

allowed as a p;nt of the recovery must,
on the <<mount reccvered,

to some ext,•nt, tP ti.:

irrespective nf the amount ' ' •,,·r·•k

c· ·

by counsel.
An award of $1,056 attorn£>y' s
forecloc.-ir.9

ii

fees

fnr success full:

$6 ,068 mortgage was upheld on appe<d

wh~r1

tic

defendant set up as il defense a hrPi1Ch uf a separ0tc contrc»
a counterclaim for specific perforrn0rice in Willla~J:>ui:c·~-~(1965)

16 lltah 2d 401,

402 l'.2d 699.

Jn this case lhe trial juc10e appecired le emphJ',1 71
relationship of th<· fpc to the amount

reroverecl, but he aJs·
·r.

before him the pleadings from which he could assc~s thr
and difficulty of the issues, and of course h£> wac
results achieved.

He may have also felt that

necessa1y for appel ]ant to reposscc,ss and s0ll

j

ffi"Jl0

t ;•ar· r"

1

rcesprrnrl<r•I

vehicle beca.ust: the bunk hnd just sent new lonn duccn,ents rr'

respondents to sian

(Defendants'

Exhibit No.

l3

27)

and wirl,r cl

h•·r

:JJ'

nr·,t

ice hod the \•ehicl e repossessed 26 days later
F::<hibit No.

·fr r::Lll·t··
1

t

R 113, 'i16).

The trial court may

it Wi1s not nc·cessary to file suit against the

clr:nts

cf-'.

28;

lH.e~i1use

just prior to the Siile of the repossessed

"',., ·: e lhe respondents had attempted to reinstate the contract
e;reeina to all of the bank's requirements, including the
rnc·reace in interest rate and the attorney's fees of $145, and to
v.y $5,000.00 toward the debt!
T11rtle Management,

ir.

(R 24, '!!10-12; T 23, L 10-11).

As

Inc. v. Haggis Management, supra, the trial

"'•:trt in this case "appropriately took into account" several
•actors

th~

Supreme Court has held to be important in deciding a

rrc:oonahlc- attorney's fee.

(3)

No abuse of discretion has been

EQllITABLE FACTORS.

There is no doubt that the

•rial reurt alsc took into account the fact that the bank made
rristake

t'·,

(T 38,

r. 18-21; see also the additional finding filed

:•h the Supreme Court on October 6, 1983) which caused the
'·.~lt

situation to arise.

After stating that appellants jury

.r1str1,;c:\ ions "cross and criss-cross"
1-.c.s rot "foolishness"

(T 35, L 1)

(T 34, L 23-24), but that it

to go to such lengths in

•''f-ilri1tion fer trial, the judge stated "But I am not going to
-.•:

«ll er that to the defendi'lnts in the case."
Th~

t,.,.,

t•,

'"'

11

•r1t

i r 't

(T 34, L 2-3).

rei'lsons for refusing to assess all of the requested
th0 defendants

(respondents) were that

(1)

"And so I

this ccis0 thi1t the attorney fee is in relationship to the
Io

b0 assessed against the defendant."
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(T 37, L 24-25),

and

(2) when pressed by appellant's couns0l to justih r, 1 ,.

ruling,

the transcript reports:
"Mr. Hughes:
Let me say, for the re<x•rd, T t·hi
fees are r·xtremely low for what h,1s haprencr1 11
case.
The Court:
All right.
As a matter of face, l
the findings the fact that the initial mistak~
by the bank.
And that's uncontroverted, isn't
correct?" (T 38, L 15-21).

1_>

The trial court WilS basically reducing the requested fePs tc
place some of the loss on the bank because it had mistaken!"
the respondents'

loan up on a semi-annual basis instPad cf,,

monthly basis, and had informed respondents on several c)ua·
that they did not need to make a payment because they were
current and even paid in advance,

in spite of protests rno,ie t·

respondents that something was wrong.

The triill court

c~id

re

feel it would be proper to assess defendants with all ot cl''
bank's fees which were incurred as a result of the

bank'~

mistake.
Another equitable consideration the trial court"''
aware of at the time it ruled included the fact that to cc1
the bank's own mistake the bank was demanding that defE'ndcrt•
all the accrued interest immediately and sign new 10nn docui;e-at a four

(4%)

percPnt hi9her interest rate than the origir. 1 '

loan.
The bank sent defendants new loan documents

,1\: tl•e

higher interest rate on ,June 29, 1981, requesting that ckCC'
sign and return them or "finance the truck somewhere
(Defendants'

Exhibit No.

27).

rl••

ThesEe new loan doc-umenls ccd-

for the first payment to be made on August 5, 1981 ·

1"

•iivr:n by the bank for the signature and return of these
,i,cc "'-,-,

~,,,

Defendants reasonably assumed they had until the date

,,t, .

first

payment on August 5, 1981 to either sign and return

c1,en n· l.o "fj nance the truck somewhPre else"
ihit No.

Without further notice, the bank proceeded to

the truck, giving instructions to that effect on July

~cposs~ss

·], 1981

27).

(Defendants'

(C0fendants' Exhibit No.

28), and accomplished the

r'c[K'ssessir,; un July 25, 1981 and two days later informed
~eferda~ts

by mail that it was the bank

teken their vehicle

(and not a thief) who had

(Defendants' Exhibit No. 29).

Respondents

rcrtend that the trial court took into account the equities of
the bo1,k' s act in repossession without notice some ten
~·1or

(10)

days

to the expiration of the bank's offer.
A final

hc·•e taken

equitable consideration the trial court may

into account was the bank president's cavalier

tt1tude the dav of the sale of the repossessed vehicle.

The

'Pfendants had finally given in to all of the bank's demands,
unreasonable as they were in light of the fact it was the bank's
cwr, mistake, and had agreed to pay the costs of repossession, the
attnrnev's fees to that point of $145
1

''

1•;hr>r

evajl~blc

(T 23, L 10-11), to pay the

rntcrest rate, and to even apply the $5,000.00 they had
on the loan balance in order to reinstate the loan.

n,r ''"''' r-rc-sident, upon being told about the agreement, or
' ' cp

'"'lr•ss
1

,,,

1

r1y

t 1 ,,\ions
r'P 1

cis he phrased it, ordered that the truck be sold

cndants paid the entire amount due, all without even

the interest to learn the details of the agreement!
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(R

140, Deposition Of John Villiarn Eickman,

pauo o

11,,r,s

1-~,

10-11).

Appellant admits,

if,,-t

trial court found "that the
prevailing party,

then, the court night redu·cec •.he· ewaru l·

'reasonable extent'."

Respcridents sutrit tr.at thjc. :s exac•_

what the trial judc;e did in this case,

for the "equities"

described above.
These kind of equitable consideracions arp basen c·
facts and circumstances of the case, ar.d as s·1ch, arF •,;•_th•
province of the trial court and should not l iahtly
on appeal.

t~

·:iislurl-

Thus, appellant's argument ire Point 1: cf •heir

r:_.

that the trial court a\<.·arded a reduced fee based solel_'.:_ on

ci.,

firdins that the fee should not approxirr.ate the arr.cur,· r2cc.e'.is

absc~ute

wrong on its prerr.ise that this

sole basis fer its

As shown above,

aw~rd.

Vlcis

the

tr1,1_

cc'.::

U·c, tr13j c-curt

considered con"licting evidence on the issue cf a re0sc-nab'!e
'>nd took into acrount the equitable factors described abr··e
rraking the award,

as

1,·p]

1 as the relationshio nf the •ee '·

amount recovered.

l'.s the Turtle ~'.ilnaaernent,

Management,

case rr.3kes clear, one of t;-.e rro:::t i;-'S'-~·t2"c

sut ra,

Inc. '-" Haaois

factors the Utah Supreme Ccurt has mention"d in dete~rci·1ir.c
reasonable fee is the amount recovered.
discretio~

ha~

beer

Clearly, re ~ri..:s,_, ~~

sho~~.

The John Deere Compan,· "

Catalaro 525 ;' - ~c-

1974) case upon which appellarts relv for 2uthor1tv
attorney's fee::: awarde(_:

(SJ ,500)

rr2~

exceed tf'.e ~1rK 1- nt- rer,"

di:dinguishable on two counts, first, that case involved a
'"'"'"'~·;
rl

'0•,

JUclgment of $1,300.59, much smaller than in this case,

rF•pondPnts readily acknowledge that at smaller amounts, the
0ill mnre

••«O!icl,

frequently approximate the amount recovered; and

the court in that case specifically found that the

"equities in this action do not favor Catalano."
thP lri?l

In this case

court specifically laid the blame on the bank for

hoving made the mistake that led to a default situation.
F'1rther, this case did not go to a full blown trial like the John
Dee1e Company case, and yet only $1,500 attorney's fees were

•0ardec1 in that case, the same as in this case.
( 4)

STANDARDS ON APPELLATE REVIEW.

Manag~men~_t__l_nc.

In Turtle

v. Haggis Management, supra, the Utah Supreme

rouct elso delineated the standards used to review a lower
court's award of attorney's fees,

saying, at page 671, that:

"The amount to be awarded as attorney's fees is
generally within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
Yreka United, Inc. v. Harrison, Idaho, 510 P.
2d 775, 780 (1973).
This Court has upheld an award of
attorney's fees where the amount does not appear to be
unreRsonable.
Parkinson v. Amundson, 122 Utah 443, 250
r. 2d 944 (1952). In the absence of abuse of
discretion, the amount of the award by the district
court will not be disturbed.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 78
(1965) ."
--The courts appear to be agreed that it is fundamental
'',ell

Lhe rLu•onable value of attorney's fees is a question of

•·I ,ind th,1t the findings of the trial court must be upheld by a

""'ll•C, cuurt unless clearly erroneous.
i l~-"''"~~_'J~own

646 P. 2d 692

For example, in

(Utah 1982) the plaintiff's

.u,'1 n0y aclvocRtE·d $1, 362 .50 as a reasonable fee while

18

defendant's attorney judged $750.00 to be rca~onabl<'.
affirming the lower court's award of $Qfn.oo,

11 ,

thP ~ourt

"'"t

"In the absence of a showinq of patent er rc'r nr -1,
abuse of discretion, we do not disturb th" ~11ra 1w 11 ,
the trial court."
In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom 578 P.2d 520

(!Jt2h 1978)

Uc u~d1s~'

evidence was that a reasonable attorney's fee would be $8UO,:
the trial court nevertheless awarded only $500.

On

apr.co.1

1

t!.r

Court held:
"Even though that evidence is undisputed, the tnal
judge was not necessarily compelled to accept sucn
self-interested testimony whole cloth and make suet.
award; and in the absence of patent error or C"Jpar
abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb his
findings and judgment."

POINT II
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEfS FOP
DEFENDING TllF. COUNTERCLAIM
l'-ppellant contends,

in Point II of its brief, thill

trial court erred in awarding only $1,500 attorney's fePo c1t''
appellant had "successfully defended" the counterclaim.
Appellant takes too much credit, as the counterclaim was m.t
"successfully defended", but was compromised by the stipulatu·
to submit the issue of attorney's fees to the trial court
accept as final whatever ruling was made.
Appellant makes a great deal of noise about thP
horrendous counterclaim of $205,000, but fails to mc~tic.ri Ii
the counterclaimed prayed for "$5,000.00, or such othPr
proved at trial"

(R 45, 'Pl

•Ml

and for "$200,000.00 ~~~~lc___ut:,:·

19

:II'''~'!:'!

:is will serv<' the purpose of punitive damages."

(R

45,

\11 I •

Appellant does not cite any authority for Point I I of

·l• Lricf, and for good reason, since there is no authority that
,u.~

·c,::;sfully defending a claim automatically includes an award of

?tt0rney's fees to the prevailing party.
pc int i•' mentioned in many cases,

The Utah rule on this

and was stated again in Turtle

t::::i11ogemenl, Inc. v. Haggis Management, supra, page 671, where the
rourt states:
"Utah adheres to the well-established rule that
fees generally cannot be recovered unless
provided for by statute or by contract.
B & R Supply
Company v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P. 2d 1216
(1972).
If by contract, the award of attorney's fees
is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the
contract.
25 C.J.S. Damages § 50 (1966) ."
~ttorney's

Appellant may argue that the promissory note and/or
c~curity

agr0ement enables appellant to claim attorney's fees,

tut those fees, by their terms, are limited to pursuing the
bank's remedies in seeking collection, but not to protecting the
tonk trom liobility should it be sued for wrongdoing.

And if the

cttorney's fees clauses contained in the note and security
eqreemcnt did extend to cover the bank's wrongs, the clause would
h0 struck down as void as against public policy by allowing a
~r.ngdoer

to indemnify himself from expense of attorney's fees.
Clearly, if respondents had paid the deficiency claimed

'.'!

arc·pcll<rnt in its complainl and had then brought suit against

>.I»· l

c•nk

(assuming the respondents' claims were not cowpulsory

'nu11terclaims), the bank would not be able to call up the note

20

and security agreement for ils <1ttnrnt>y's fLc·t·s,

siIH'r,

tlir:

nr,'

would have been paid and extinouishcd.

CONCLUSION

Reviewing the disputed facts in the liqht rnnst
favorable to the

~udgment

entered in the tri ul court,

,1

ilt

recognizing that the judgment of the trial court is presumed
be correct and the findings sustainerl unless there is pater,l
error or a clear abuse of discretion, it is respectfully
requested that the judgment be affirmed.
Pespectfully submitted this /2J!i._day
l

C)

8 4.

~·<~te.;
PNI~MILES

Attorney For Respondc11 ts

MAILING CEPTlFJCATF
!

do hereby certify that I mailed two true ancl cow

copies of the foregoing RESPOND~NT'S BRIEF, postaqe prepa·J,
Michael D. Hughes and Dale F. Chamberli1in, at Tf!Ol"PSON, m:cic
REBER, 148 East Tabernilcle, St. Ceorge, Utah 84770 L!1i;'
of September, 1984.
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